Glaski vs Bank of America NA et al – FOR PUBLICATION

Glaski vs Bank of America NA et al – FOR PUBLICATION

Edstrom_MortgageSecuritization_POSTER_17_x_22_v4_1By Daniel Edstrom
DTC Systems, Inc.

On August 8, 2013 the Fifth Appellate District in the Court of Appeal of the State of California ordered the Thomas A. Glaski vs Bank of America, NA et al decision published, stating:

 

 

As the nonpublished opinion filed on July 31, 2013, in the above entitled matter hereby meets the standards for publication specified in the California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c), it is ordered that the opinion be certified for publication in the Official Reports.

Based on the importance of this case, the text of the July 31, 2013 ruling is listed verbatim:

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THOMAS A. GLASKI,Plaintiff and Appellant,v.

BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION et al.

Defendants and Respondents.

F064556

(Super. Ct. No. 09CECG03601)

OPINION

 

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County.  Alan M. Simpson, Judge.

Law Offices of Richard L. Antognini and Richard L. Antognini; Law Offices of Catarina M. Benitez and Catarina M. Benitez, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

AlvaradoSmith, Theodore E. Bacon, and Mikel A. Glavinovich, for Defendants and Respondents.

-ooOoo-

INTRODUCTION

            Before Washington Mutual Bank, FA (WaMu) was seized by federal banking regulators in 2008, it made many residential real estate loans and used those loans as collateral for mortgage-backed securities.[1]  Many of the loans went into default, which led to nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings.  Some of the foreclosures generated lawsuits, which raised a wide variety of claims.  The allegations that the instant case shares with some of the other lawsuits are that (1) documents related to the foreclosure contained forged signatures of Deborah Brignac and (2) the foreclosing entity was not the true owner of the loan because its chain of ownership had been broken by a defective transfer of the loan to the securitized trust established for the mortgage-backed securities.  Here, the specific defect alleged is that the attempted transfers were made after the closing date of the securitized trust holding the pooled mortgages and therefore the transfers were ineffective.

In this appeal, the borrower contends the trial court erred by sustaining defendants’ demurrer as to all of his causes of action attacking the nonjudicial foreclosure.  We conclude that, although the borrower’s allegations are somewhat confusing and may contain contradictions, he nonetheless has stated a wrongful foreclosure claim under the lenient standards applied to demurrers.  We conclude that a borrower may challenge the securitized trust’s chain of ownership by alleging the attempts to transfer the deed of trust to the securitized trust (which was formed under New York law) occurred after the trust’s closing date.  Transfers that violate the terms of the trust instrument are void under New York trust law, and borrowers have standing to challenge void assignments of their loans even though they are not a party to, or a third party beneficiary of, the assignment agreement.

We therefore reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

Continue reading “Glaski vs Bank of America NA et al – FOR PUBLICATION”

in RE: Macklin: Deutsche Must Answer Wrongful Foreclosure and Quiet Title

in RE: Macklin: Deutsche Must Answer Wrongful Foreclosure and Quiet Title

By Daniel Edstrom
DTC Systems, Inc.

Excerpts on Wrongful Foreclosure (changed by the Judge Sargis to Breach of Contract)

… a record has been created that someone not of record title purported to take action on a Deed of Trust prior to compliance with Civil Code 2932.5.

The court will not sanction conduct by this Defendant which puts into question the validity of the nonjudicial foreclosure process and California real property records.  Though this issue could have been simply addressed by the recording of a new notice of default months ago, the ninety days under the new notice of default allowed to run and this creditor be on the door step of conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure sale consistent with the California statutes, it has elected to continue with the existing notice of default, subsequent substitution of trustee, and sale.

The contract between the parties is the Note and Deed of Trust.

Excerpt on Quiet Title

Though not artfully done, Macklin sufficiently explains that he asserts superior title to the Property over the Trustee’s Deed through which DBNTC asserts its interest in the Property.  Given that Macklin has asserted that DBNTC cannot show that it complied with the minimal requirements for properly conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, the motion to dismiss the Tenth Cause of Action is denied.

Download order here:  http://dtc-systems.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Macklin-222-Order.pdf

Download memorandum opinion and decision (part 1) here:  http://dtc-systems.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Macklin-221-Memorandum_Opinion_and_Decision_Part1.pdf

Download memorandum opinion and decision (part 2) here:  http://dtc-systems.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Macklin-221-Memorandum_Opinion_and_Decision_Part2.pdf

State of Missouri 136 Count Indictment – 68 Class C Felonies for Forgery and 68 Class B Misdemeanors for False Declarations

State of Missouri 136 Count Indictment – 68 Class C Felonies for Forgery and 68 Class B Misdemeanors for False Declarations

By Daniel Edstrom
DTC Systems, Inc.

Thanks to Charles Cox and George Christian for locating this indictment.  Each count lists either a forgery or a misdemeanor.  DOCX LLC is named throughout the indictment.  On April 13, 2011 the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Officer of Comptroller of the Currency, and the Office of Thrift Supervision issued a Cease and Desist Consent Order against Lender Processing Services, Inc., DocX, LLC and LPS Default Solutions, Inc. making the following findings:

WHEREAS, in providing document execution services to Examined Servicers, including services that facilitated completing foreclosures, LPS and its employees allegedly:

(a) Executed numerous affidavits and similar sworn statements (collectively, “Affidavits”) making various assertions, such as the ownership of the mortgage note and mortgage (or deed of trust), the amount of principal and interest due, and the fees and expenses chargeable to the borrower, in which the affiant represented that the assertions in the Affidavit were made based on personal knowledge or based on a review by the affiant of the relevant books and records, when, in many cases, they were not based on such knowledge or review. LPS executed these Affidavits on behalf of Examined Servicers knowing they would be filed in state courts and in connection with bankruptcy proceedings in federal courts; Continue reading “State of Missouri 136 Count Indictment – 68 Class C Felonies for Forgery and 68 Class B Misdemeanors for False Declarations”

California Appeals Court: Notice of Default is Void if Description of Default Includes “if any”

Edstrom_MortgageSecuritization_POSTER_17_x_22_v4_1California Appeals Court: Notice of Default is Void if Description of Default Includes “if any”

By Daniel Edstrom
DTC Systems, Inc.

Thank you to HYDROGENE for this one.  According to this decision, the “if any” in the following of a Notice of Default voids the document:

TOGETHER WITH LATE CHARGES AS SET FORTH IN SAID NOTE AND DEED OF TRUST, ADVANCES, ASSESSMENTS AND ATTORNEY’S FEES, IF ANY

UPDATE NOTE added 1/9/2012: The Supreme Court of California denied review of this case but ordered that the opinion be not officially published (See California Court–Rules 976, 977 and 979)

Excerpt (fairly long):

Validity Of Notice Of Default
EMC sought to exercise the power of sale in the Deed of Trust on Anolik’s home based on Anolik’s alleged breach of various obligations secured by the Deed of Trust. Anolik alleged in the fourth cause of action in his second amended complaint (for wrongful foreclosure) that “the events of default as alleged . . . in the Notice of Default . . . [we]re false and untrue” and that “the Notice of Default and Election to Sell [wa]s void” as a result.

The trial court concluded the Notice of Default “was proper and is not invalid or void.” Anolik contends the trial court erred in this conclusion. We agree. “The procedure for foreclosing on security by a trustee’s sale pursuant to a deed of trust is set forth in Civil Code section 2924 et seq.”5 (Miller v. Cote (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 888, 894.) Because nonjudicial foreclosure is a “drastic sanction” and a “draconian remedy” (Baypoint Mortgage Corp. v. Crest Premium Real Estate etc. Trust (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 818, 827, 830), “[t]he statutory requirements must be strictly complied with.” (Miller, at p. 894.) Continue reading “California Appeals Court: Notice of Default is Void if Description of Default Includes “if any””

JPMorgan (WaMu) Dismissal Overruled and Judicial Notice of Recorded Documents DENIED

JPMorgan (WaMu) Dismissal Overruled and Judicial Notice of Recorded Documents DENIED

By Daniel Edstrom
DTC Systems, Inc.

Attorney J. Edward Kerley (Hereford Kerley LLP) presents a 7 page complaint (4 pages when you remove the case heading and the whitespace) with 4 causes of action (Leon Taylor vs. JPMorgan Chase).  JPMorgan Chase lawyers respond with 211 pages (including exhibits, which make up about 190 pages +/-).  The original note and Deed of Trust named Washington Mutual Bank, FA as the Lender and Beneficiary.

Excerpt from the complaint:

On or before February 27, 2007, Mr. Taylor is informed and believes that his promissory note was sold by Washington Mutual Bank, FA, to WaMu Asset Acceptance Corporation.

..

The challanged foreclosure is based upon an Assignment of Deed of Trust dated March 15, 2011.  JPMorgan, as successor in interest to Washington Mutual Bank, FA, purports to assign its beneficial interests in the deed of trust to Bank of America, National Association.  The assignment is void and improper because JPMorgan has no right or interest in the promissory note as of March 15, 2011, and such purported assignment is fraudulent and false. Continue reading “JPMorgan (WaMu) Dismissal Overruled and Judicial Notice of Recorded Documents DENIED”

Texas Ropes One In: Motion to Dismiss Denied

Texas Ropes One In: Motion to Dismiss Denied

By Daniel Edstrom
DTC Systems, Inc.
http://www.dtc-systems.net

From April Charney:

…”If the holder of the deed of trust does not own or hold the note, the deed of trust serves no purpose, is impotent, and cannot be a vehicle for depriving the grantor of the deed of trust of ownership of the property described in the deed of trust….[finding that]…inherent in the procedural steps outlined in the Texas Property Code is the assumption that whatever entity qualifies as a “mortgagee” either owns the note or is serving as an agent for the owner or holder of the note; and, the statute assumes that when a foreclosure is conducted by someone other than the owner or holder of the note, the person conducting the foreclosure will be acting as agent or nominee for the owner or holder…Otherwise, the Texas statutory law would make no sense, and would be directly at odds with long-standing, basic principles governing the relationship between real estate borrowers, on the one hand, and their corresponding secured real estate lenders, on the other.” (edited from the below decision):
JANE McCARTHY, Plaintiff, vs. BANK OF AMERICA, NA, BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP, and FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION, Defendants. NO. 4:11-CV-356-A December 22, 2011
 

Legal Standing At Inception

Legal Standing At Inception

By Daniel Edstrom
DTC Systems, Inc.

No I am not an attorney and no I am not providing legal advice.  This is the name of an article I just read posted on Neil Garfield’s LivingLies blog.  The article is from Mark Stopa, an attorney in Florida.  Read this article first and then come back and read my comments below: http://livinglies.wordpress.com/2011/12/19/legal-standing-at-inception/

When I saw the title, I thought awesome, they will go back to the origination of the loan.  But they went back to the time the judicial foreclosure case was filed.  This is a good argument and it should be fairly straight forward, or at least as straight forward as anything can be in a legal proceeding.  What I was looking for was what I heard this last week from somebody.  They went to bankruptcy court and told the judge that they had evidence that their loan was table funded, which means the named lender did not provide the money to fund the loan.  The money to fund the loan came from an unknown and undisclosed third party.  The bankruptcy judge made a simple statement.  The judge said that if the named originator did not fund the loan, then they have nothing to transfer, and the movant in the motion for relief from stay (the bank) would therefore have nothing.  This judge understands that the note is only evidence of the obligation, it is not the actual obligation.  Transfer of the note or the security instrument (Mortgage, Deed of Trust, Security Deed or Mortgage Deed) without an interest in the obligation itself, is meaningless.  That is the type of standing issue that I would like to see attorneys make in all states.

Is this why under Regulation “Z” table funded loans have the presumption of being predatory?

Deed of Trust Example Language

[Picture: MERS Shareholders]
Deed of Trust Example Language

By Daniel Edstrom
DTC System, Inc.

I have read numerous cases including appeals court cases (both Federal and State).  It appears to me that the actual language from the Security Instrument regarding MERS is being brought up or argued in a very general way and without a thorough analysis.  I am not an attorney and will not provide legal advice to anyone.  This is not legal advice but provided only for educational and informational purposes only.  This is simply what a standard CALIFORNIA-Single Family-Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac UNIFORM INSTRUMENT WITH MERS Form 3005 looks like, in relation to the main MERS language (not all inclusive).

  • This security Instrument secures to Lender: (i) the repayment of the Loan, and all renewals, extensions and modifications of the Note; and (ii) the performance of Borrower’s covenants and agreements under this Security Instrument and the Note.
  • For this purpose, Borrower irrevocably grants and conveys to Trustee, in trust, with power of sale, the following described property […]
  • “MERS” is Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
  • MERS is the beneficiary under this Security Instrument
  • MERS is a separate corporation that is acting solely as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns. 
  • The beneficiary of this Security Instrument is MERS (solely as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns) and the successors and assigns of MERS.
  • Borrower understands and agrees that MERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by Borrower in this Security Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS (as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns) has the right: to exercise any or all of those interests, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property; and to take any action required of Lender including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling this Security Instrument 
  •  

US Bank is not the Note Holder – North Carolina: Bass vs. US Bank

US Bank is not the Note Holder – North Carolina: Bass vs. US Bank

By Daniel Edstrom
DTC Systems, Inc.

This case is listed here without comment.  The issues of endorsements, allonges, burden of proof, etc. are raised here and are very illuminating.

In the Matter of the foreclosure of a Deed of Trust executed by Tonya R. Bass in the original amount of $139,988.00 dated October 12, 2005, recorded in Book 4982, Page 86, Durham County Registry,
Substitute Trustee Services, Inc., as Substitute Trustee,

No. COA11-565.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: December 6, 2011.

K&L Gates, LLP, by A. Lee Hogewood III, and Brian C. Fork for Petitioner-appellant.

Legal Aid of North Carolina, Inc., by E. Maccene Brown, Gregory E. Pawlowski, John Christopher Lloyd, and Andre C. Brown, for Respondent-appellee.

ROBERT N. HUNTER, JR., Judge.

U.S. Bank, National Association, as Trustee, c/o Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Petitioner”) appeals the trial court’s order dismissing foreclosure proceedings against Respondent Tonya R. Bass. Petitioner assigns error to the trial court’s determination that Petitioner is not the legal holder of a promissory note executed by Respondent and therefore lacks authorization to foreclose on Respondent’s property securing the note under a deed of trust. After careful review, we affirm.

I. Factual & Procedural Background Continue reading “US Bank is not the Note Holder – North Carolina: Bass vs. US Bank”

Wild Deeds, Assignments and ‘Dangerous Innovation’

Wild Deeds, Assignments and ‘Dangerous Innovation’

By Daniel Edstrom
DTC Systems, Inc.

As much as things change, they remain the same.  Wild Deeds, Strangers to Title, Nominee’s, Agents, Evidence, etc., have always been issues in real estate transactions.  Thanks to Monica Graham for finding this case.   Look at this excerpt regarding “dangerous innovation” decades before the mortgage meltdown:

In the present case, we would have to assume the position of Russ and Ethyl Green in the chain of title, that the Crestmore Company had complied with the statutory provisions relating to the use of a fictitious name, and that P. H. Wierman was a member of the firm with the authority to execute an assignment of the note made payable to that firm. Such assumptions, would indeed, constitute a “dangerous innovation.”

This excerpt regards proof of the chain of title:

[6c] For the above reasons it appears that plaintiffs failed to prove a valid assignment of the note and third trust deed to them. As assignees they stand in the same position as their assignor, the Crestmore Company, and must prove their chain of title to the note in question.

This excerpt is in regards to the burden of proof in proving an assignment:

The burden of proving an assignment falls upon the party asserting rights thereunder (Read v. Buffum, supra, 79 Cal. 77 [21 P. 555, 12 Am.St.Rep. 131]Ford v. Bushard, 116 Cal. 273 [48 P. 119]Bovard v. Dickenson, 131 Cal. 162 [63 P. 162]Nakagawa v. Okamoto, 164 Cal. 718 [130 P. 707]). [8] In an action by an assignee to enforce an assigned right, the evidence must not only be sufficient to establish the fact of assignment when that fact is in issue (Quan Wye v. Chin Lin Hee, 123 Cal. 185 [55 P. 783]) but the measure of sufficiency requires that the evidence of assignment be clear and positive to protect an obligor from any further claim by the primary obligee (Gustafson v. Stockton etc. R. R. Co., 132 Cal. 619 [64 P. 995]). Continue reading “Wild Deeds, Assignments and ‘Dangerous Innovation’”