Securitization Workshop for Attorneys January 29th 2011 in Los Angeles

Securitization Workshop for Attorneys January 29th 2011 in Los Angeles

By Daniel Edstrom

Join us for our 2nd Securitization Workshop for Attorneys being held in Los Angeles on January 29th, 2011.  Visit the event webiste for more information: http://securedocumentresearch.eventbrite.com and visit our product page for a super early registration price if you sign up by December 31, 2010: http://dtc-systems.net/products/securitization-workshop-attorneys-los-angeles-ca-january-29th-2011/

Description of event:

SECURITIZATION WORKSHOP FOR ATTORNEYS
 January 29th, 2010 – in Los Angeles, CALIFORNIA

 [Location will be determined soon]

SECURE DOCUMENT RESEARCH

Auburn, CA 95603; ph: 530.888.9600

DTC Systems, Inc.

[email protected]://www.dtc-systems.net

 Presented by:

Secure Document Research and DTC Systems, Inc.in Association with the Garfield Continuum and Neil F. Garfield, Esq.
http://livinglies.wordpress.com
REGISTER EARLY, LIMITED SEATING IS AVAILABLE

Continue reading “Securitization Workshop for Attorneys January 29th 2011 in Los Angeles”

World Savings Bank, A Living Legacy of the Subprime Crisis

World Savings Bank, A Living Legacy of the Subprime Crisis

By Daniel Edstrom
DTC Systems, Inc.
http://www.dtc-systems.net
http://livinglies.wordpress.com

World Savings Bank loans were the worst of the worst loans that were packaged up and sold to homeowners from the 1990’s until 2008.  These loans consisted of pick a pay loans with negative amortization.  Typical predatory negative amortization loans allow for the original loan balance to increase to 110% maximum.  Meaning if the loan was originally issued at $100,000.00, the loan balance can keep going negative until it reaches $110,000.00.   World Savings Bank decided that this wasn’t enough and allowed their negative amortization loans to reach 125% of the original principal balance.  This is the gift that keeps on giving.  As home values have been decimated by the meltdown and continue to drop, properties with World Savings Bank loans have principal balances that keep going up and up and up.  No underwriting was given on these loans, the value of the properties and the promise and belief they would ever rise was the only consideration given to support the loan.  The other consideration used in “lending” the money had nothing to do with the homeowners.  World Savings Bank wanted to entice investors into parting with their money.  Lots of money.  In fact BILLIONS and BILLIONS of dollars.  It turns out that World Savings Bank had NO STAKE in the transaction, they were only the middleman.  One big fat rich middleman.  This was at the expense of both borrowers and investors who purchased certificates from the many REMICs setup by World Savings Bank.  What REMICs?  What securitizations?  Didn’t Wells Fargo tell you that these loans were securitized?   Why does the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the OCC) allow Wells Fargo Bank to foreclose in their own name on the tens of thousands of World Savings Bank foreclosures?  The OCC knows much more than the American people what World Savings Bank, Wachovia and Wells Fargo Bank are doing to the American homeowners.  Namely that Wells Fargo Bank is walking into court claiming to be the real party in interest, claiming that they own these loans and that they were never securitized.   Of course this is nothing new for Wells Fargo Bank or Wachovia.  Just look at the auto loans securitized by Wachovia Dealer Services.  Wachovia Dealer Services did not loan the money as these were table funded automobile loans.  The money used to fund the automobile loans came from various trusts that pooled the loans and sold them to investors.  The trusts and/or the investors allegedly own the loans and not Wachovia Dealer Services or Wells Fargo Bank.  But you would never know this by going to just about any state court in this country and looking at who the plaintiff is thats filing a judicial lawsuit on these automobile loans: Wachovia Dealer Services.  Reading the Prospectus for these deals is a real eye opener:  Title will remain in the name of Wachovia Dealer Services and even though the loans are sold, the abstract of title given to the DMV will not be updated to reflect the correct ownership.  They go on to admit that title has not been perfected and that the certificateholders are at risk.  It even goes on to say that the loan contracts will not be updated to reflect that ownership has changed (endorsement under state UCC laws).  So you have no endorsement and no transfer (no perfection).  The beneficial and equitable rights have been sold.  The above all describes predatory banking, lending and servicing at its worst.

Continue reading “World Savings Bank, A Living Legacy of the Subprime Crisis”

Understanding the Governing Documents 1

Understanding the Governing Documents 1

by Daniel Edstrom

Wall Street financial engineering is a thing to behold.  Of course most of it is in complex legal terms difficult to comprehend.  Let’s take a look at a few definitions in a Prospectus Supplement and break them down.  This is from the RASC Series 2005-EMX4 Trust put out by GMAC.

Subordination. So long as the Class M Certificates remain outstanding, losses on the mortgage loans which are not covered by amounts payable under excess cash flow or overcollateralization will be allocated to the Class M Certificates that remain outstanding with the lowest payment priority, and the other classes of certificates will not bear any portion of such losses. If none of the Class M Certificates are outstanding, all such losses will be allocated to the Class A Certificates as described in this prospectus supplement.

What this means: Numerous classes of certificates are issued.  In this trust the Class A certificates are paid in priority first while any losses first come out of the Class M certificates.  Once the Class A certificates principal is paid in full, the principal is applied to the Class M certificates.  Once the Class M certificates absorb all losses and the principal is reduced to zero, the Class A certificates will suffer losses.  The diagram to the left shows what this looks like.  Is there a loss?  Only if the loss is not covered by “amounts payable under excess cash flow” or “overcollateralization.”

DEBT SERVICE REDUCTION–Modifications of the terms of a mortgage loan resulting from a bankruptcy proceeding, including a reduction in the amount of the monthly payment on the related mortgage loan, but not any permanent forgiveness of principal.

What this means: A reduction in the monthly payment based on a bankruptcy ruling but not including any permanent principal forgiveness.  This doesn’t mean much at the moment but we will revisit this shortly.

Realized Loss–As to any defaulted mortgage loan that is finally liquidated the portion of the Stated Principal Balance plus accrued and unpaid interest remaining after application of all amounts recovered, net of amounts reimbursable to the master servicer for related Advances, Servicing Advances and other expenses, towards interest and principal owing on the mortgage loan. For a mortgage loan the principal balance of which has been reduced in connection with bankruptcy proceedings, the amount of the reduction. As to any mortgage loan that has been the subject of a Debt Service Reduction, the amount of the reduction. For a mortgage loan that has been modified, following a default or if a default was reasonably foreseeable, the amount of principal that has been forgiven, the amount by which a monthly payment has been reduced due to a reduction of the interest rate, and any Servicing Advances that are forgiven and reimbursable to the master servicer or servicer. To the extent the master servicer receives Subsequent Recoveries with respect to any mortgage loan, the amount of the Realized Loss with respect to that mortgage loan will be reduced to the extent such recoveries are received.

What this means: This is part of the Wall Street engineering genius that is difficult to understand.  Basically what it is saying is that despite what you might believe,  despite what a judge rules in bankruptcy, and despite the fact that a loan modification has been applied to a loan, the investors receive the original payment of principal and interest.  Even after a ruling by a standing bankruptcy judge the investors receive the original principal and interest based upon the original note (or at least the copy of the note allegedly pooled into the trust).  One can only imagine the book-keeping nightmares that servicers face keeping multiple sets of books and trying to keep them all straight.  This is my best guess as to why the servicers have such a hard time keeping the accounting straight for those in bankruptcy.  Just ask O. Max Gardner III how often the servicers mess up bankruptcy rulings.

Read all of the above again.  Even if the principal and interest payment are reduced in bankruptcy, the servicer is required to advance the principal and interest of the original mortgage loan as amortized.  Once the loan is liquidated (paid off), the principal loss is calculated at that time and advances which have not been paid by other forms of credit enhancements are paid back to the advancing party.   THE INVESTORS GET THEIR MONEY during the course of the loan (whether or not paid by the homeowners), then it gets ripped out of their hands all at once when the loss is calculated.  But you never know for sure whether the investors will actually suffer a loss or if the credit enhancements will pay for it.  This is one of many reasons why the homeowner is entitled to a full accounting.

Bankruptcy judges be warned: Wall Street takes your rulings with a grain of salt and applies them in their own fashion.  This can only stem from multiple sets of books that are concealed, misrepresented and not disclosed to the courts.

Disclaimer Reminder:  This is a blog for educational and informational use only and does not constitute legal advice.  Take no action without first consulting an attorney in your jurisdiction.

Patt Morrison on Southern California Public Radio

Patt Morrison on Southern California Public Radio

Listen to the recorded version of the Patt Morrison’s show on scpr.org

http://www.scpr.org/programs/patt-morrison/2010/12/14/who-really-owns-your-housecould-mortgage-transfers/

Guests:

Katherine Porter, visiting professor of bankruptcy, consumer finance & secured credit at the Harvard Law School

Daniel Edstrom, head of the securitization auditing firm DTC-Systems

Securitization issues related to foreclosures and paperwork is discussed.

Katherine Porter states that Wrongful foreclosure is when the house is foreclosed on and there  is no default.  This is an interesting definition because in nearly all cases in securitization, the loans are current.  The obligation is not in default because the Securitization Trustee and the investors have received all payments.  So nearly all Securitization foreclosures are wrongful foreclosures?  That is the elephant in the room that nobody wants to look at.

Why are the loans current in securitization?  Because the servicers and securitization trustees are required and obligated to make the payments whether or not they receive the payment from the homeowner.

The Chart Heard Around the World

By Daniel Edstrom 

The following are excerpts from testimony submitted by the Honorable New York Supreme Court Justice F. Dana Winslow.  Submitted as an attachment is my Securitization Reverse Engineering diagram of my families loan / securitization.  It is now part of the Congressional Record.  

  

F. DANA WINSLOW
NYS SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
Before the House of Representatives
DECEMBER 2, 2010

ON 

CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF THE
FORECLOSURE
CRISIS
 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

 FORECLOSED JUSTICE:
CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS 

Hon. F. Dana Winslow
December 2, 2010 

Excerpts:  

Difficulty arises in multiple unrecorded transfers of the legal
ownership of the Mortgage (with or without the transfer of the Note)
and with tracing and proving the chain of title. I refer the Committee
to the attached diagram [Attachment “A”] obtained on the internet,
which I believe to be both a nonsensical and accurate depiction of the
problems concerning mortgagee chain of title. 

Exhibit “A”:Securitization Reverse Engineering Attachment 

  

  

  

 

 

 

Professor Adam Levitin Shreds American Securitization Forum Defenses

Sunday, December 5, 2010

[From Naked Capitalism: http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2010/12/adam-levitin-shreds-the-american-securitization-forum-defense-of.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+NakedCapitalism+%28naked+capitalism%29]

Adam Levitin Shreds American Securitization Forum Defenses

It isn’t clear why the American Securitization Forum decided to walk into a buzzsaw, but the carnage is proving to be an amusing spectacle.

For readers who have not followed this wee saga, mortgage securitization abuses are increasingly looking to be a mess of Titanic proportions. The securitization industry created complex and specific procedures for getting the loans into the securitization legal vehicle, a trust. (The loan, meaning the borrower IOU, is called the note; confusingly, the lien is separate and called a mortgage or in some states, a deed of trust).

These procedures were complex for very good legal reasons. These securitizations had to pick their way very carefully through a thicket of issues: state-based real estate law; the Uniform Commercial Code; the desire to create bankruptcy remoteness (so if the originator went bust, the investors would not be exposed to the risk of lenders to the originator trying to get the notes back out of the trust); securities regulations; tax law; trust law.

These provisions were adhered to for nearly two decades. But sometime in the early 2000s, it appears that the industry simply quit observing the requirements of its own contracts, called pooling and servicing agreements. And the worst is that there are no simple fixes for the resulting mess.

If the breakdown was as widespread as it appears to be, at a minimum, in the overwhelming majority of states, it will become more and more difficult to foreclose as consumer lawyers and judges wise up to these issues. And in a worst case scenario, it is entirely possible in some, perhaps many cases, no assets got the the trusts by closing, which would make them void under New York law, which governs virtually all mortgage securitization trusts (even if true, investors may choose not to pursue that theory in a lawsuit, but more evidence of pervasive problems may lead investors use related theories to press to have the deal unwound, which is still a pretty dire outcome).

The American Securitization Forum which represents originators (it also has investors as members, but investors and independent observers see the ASF as very much originator-oriented) has decided to come out guns-a-blazing against critics. The problem is, however, that it has neither the law or facts on its side. Its strident attacks are looking a wee bit desperate.

In recent Congressional hearings, the ASF executive director Tom Deutsch provided testimony that was truly astonishing (see here and here). It asserted, in effect, that extremely clear and easy to interpret language in the PSA about how the notes were to be conveyed to the securitization meant the opposite of what they said. The contracts call for a “complete” or “unbroken” chain of endorsements. The ASF testimony argued that that very same language meant the very opposite, that no such thing needed to happen. And the testimony peculiarly personalized the attack, fixating on Georgetown law professor Adam Levitin. Even though he has almost become a fixture on Congressional panels on this topic, he is far from the only expert to have argued for this interpretation.

Levitin deigned to address the ASF argument, and his post, “Fisking the American Securitization Forum’s Congressional Testimony,” is engaging. I suggest you read it in its entirely. Here are some of the key bits:

My first thought was “gosh, ASF’s awfully defensive. They sure seem spooked.” And on looking at the details of the ASF’s rebuttal, my sense is they’re on very shaky ground if these are the best arguments they have….

ASF takes me to task because the argument I make about PSAs is not supported by caselaw. Duh. Of course it isn’t. These issues have never been litigated. The whole point I’ve been making is that there are a bunch of unresolved legal issues. I’m not the one who decides what the outcome is. I can only offer my semi-learned opinion. But just as my argument lacks caselaw support, so too does that of the ASF. At least I’m not the one who built a $1.2 trillion dollar private label residential mortgage securitization industry hinging on uncertain law…..

ASF argues that the language in many PSAs requiring a “complete” or “unbroken” chain of endorsements only means that there must be a chain of endorsements legally sufficient to effectuate the transfer of the note to the trust…

There are a few problems with this argument. First, if the ASF is correct in its claim that the loans are transferred by sale under Article 9 of the UCC, the legal sufficiency of the endorsements should simply be irrelevant. In making this claim, ASF seems to be conceding that PSAs are the governing law for RMBS transactions.

Second, it’s worth looking at the entire language used in PSAs, not the selectively quoted language referred to by the ASF. For example, consider the PSA for Securities Asset Backed Receivables LLC Trust 2005-FR3, dated July 1, 2005, § 2.01(b), July 1, 2005. It provides that the depositor will deliver to the trust:

“the original Mortgage Note bearing all intervening endorsements showing a complete chain of endorsement from the originator to the last endorsee, endorsed ‘Pay to the order of _____________, without recourse’ and signed (which may be by facsimile signature) in the name of the last endorsee by an authorized officer.”

Note the bold language (my emphasis; the italics are original). There can be no question that this language is calling for every endorsement from the originator to the trust, and cannot be satisfied with a single endorsement in blank. For deals with this language, at least, ASF’s testimony is demonstrably wrong.

Now, it is important to note that not every PSA has such language…The incidence of various PSA language is unknown, but certainly there are a good number of PSAs where there has to be a complete chain of endorsements.

Another inconvenient fact is, contrary to the ASF assertions, that judges are also looking for the chain of endorsements to make sense, without reference to the PSA. By happenstance, April Charney sent a Florida decision today which illustrates how the lack of proper endorsements derailed a foreclosure (April has graciously included me in her frequent updates to various groups of lawyers involved in foreclosure defense).

Order for BAC Home Loans Servicing v. Stentz

This order is short and make for instructive reading. The note in question was indorsed (bankruptcy courts use “indorse” for “endorse”) in blank, something the ASF says is perfectly kosher. The Florida judge is not entirely comfortable with that, noting that Florida law requires that the party prosecuting a foreclosure both own and be the holder of the note. He dismissed the case without prejudice, but notice the requirements he stipulates for any amended complaint (boldface mine):

1. Allege additional facts, not conclusions of law, that specifically set forth the and identify the present owner of the note and mortgage and the present holder of the note and mortgage and in so doing deraign the chain of ownership/holdership since the loan’s inception.

2. Allege additional facts why the note is indorsed in blank and specifically deny, if that be the case, that it or an interest has been pledged to another….

5. Allege and identify all documents, by attachment, upon which Plaintiff relies to establish ownership of the note and mortgage.

Now look at the mess we have here. How, pray tell, are the plaintiffs going to prove how the note traveled from originator to its purported current owner in the absence of having the note endorsed with a full and unbroken chain of assignments? How are they going to prove a negative (as in 2, that it wasn’t pledged to another party? How will the plaintiffs prove the transfers? A basic feature of negotiable instruments like mortgage notes is that they are transferred by delivery, not by contract or assignment, AND that the party making the transfer must endorse the instrument so that it is payable to the recipient (or it can be endorsed in blank).

Oh, and if the borrower’s attorney is at all savvy, he will find the PSA for this loan. If the plaintiffs try to claim the conveyance chain was different than that stipulated in the PSA (something the ASF also tried to argue was fine), and the borrower’s counsel points out the discrepancy. This judge looks to be the sort that would find it troubling.

Here, again by virtue of synchronicity via April Charney yesterday, is another example of a judge, this time in Ohio, refusing to foreclose. One of the reasons is the chain of assignments is broken (see the part I boldfaced):

Case: CV-09-706959
Case Caption: PROVIDENT FUNDING ASSOCIATES, L.P. vs. TAMARA TURNER, ET AL
Judge: TIMOTHY MCCORMICK
Room: 20C JUSTICE CENTER
Docket Date: 11/09/2010
Notice Type: (JEPC) JOURNAL ENTRY NOTICE
Notice ID/Batch: 16552802 – 875214

To: JAMES R DOUGLASS

MOTION OF THE DEFENDANTS PHILLIP TURNER AND TAMARA TURNER TO DISMISS FOR PLAINTIFF’S LACK OF STANDING TO FILE THE FORECLOSURE IS GRANTED. PLAINTIFF DID NOT PRESENT EVIDENCE TO THE COURT THAT IT OWNED THE SUBJECT PROMISSORY NOTE AS OF THE DATE OF THE FILING OF ITS COMPLAINT IN THIS CASE AND COULD NOT, THEREFORE, PROVE THAT IT HAD STANDING TO FILE THIS CASE. SEE WELLS FARGO BANK V. JORDAN, 2009 OHIO 1092 (8TH DIST. CT. APP., MAR. 12, 2009). MERS COULD NOT ASSIGN THE NOTE AS IT NEVER HELD THE PROMISSORY NOTE. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE ALLONGE WAS EVER AFFIXED TO THE NOTE. VIRTUAL BANK PURPORTS TO INDORSE THE NOTE TO THE PLAINTIFF, BUT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT VIRTUAL BANK HELD THE NOTE AT THE TIME OF THE INDORSEMENT. VIRTUAL BANK IS ALSO NOT THE PAYEE ON THE NOTE. COMPLAINT DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. AS PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO FILE THIS CASE, THE COUNTERCLAIM IS ALSO DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. (FINAL)
COURT COST ASSESSED TO THE PLAINTIFF(S).

CLDLJ 11/09/2010
NOTICE ISSUED

Ohio and Florida require that the party foreclosing be the owner of the note. But even in states like California, which appear merely to require that the foreclosing party be a holder, “holder” signifies more than mere possession. In IndyMac Federal v. Hwang, the judge cites the California Commercial Code (3301 (a) and 1201 (20)) and UCC (3-301 (a) and 1-201 (20)):

For an instrument payable to an identified person (such as a note in this case), there are two requirements for a person to qualify as a holder: (a), the person must be in possession of the instrument and (b) the instrument must be payable to that person.

These examples prove a basic point. There is good reason why the PSAs stipulated a complete, unbroken chain of endorsements. The absence of them creates huge problems, independent of the requirements of the PSA, in enforcing the note.

As we said in our New York Times op-ed,

The people who so carefully designed the mortgage securitization process unwittingly devised a costly trap for people who ran roughshod over their handiwork. The trap has closed — and unless the mortgage finance industry agrees to a sensible way out of it, the entire economy will be the victim.

The ASF, perversely or perhaps predictably, is persisting in being part of the problem rather than part of the solution.

More on this topic (What’s this?)

Never Trust a CEO Who Does This… (Investment U, 11/4/10)

Set to Go Off (Financial Armageddon, 10/25/10)

Read more on Trust, Securitization at Wikinvest

Topics: Banana republic, Banking industry, Credit markets, Legal, Real estate

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Virginia resident gets foreclosure notice on Port St. Lucie home she sold in 1994

Virginia resident gets foreclosure notice on Port St. Lucie home she sold in 1994

December 5th, 2010 by TCPalm.com

By Nadia Vanderhoof

PORT ST. LUCIE — About 10 p.m. the Saturday after Thanksgiving, Cathy Hammers abruptly was woken up by a continuous loud banging on the front door of her Virginia home.

With two kids in college and a third touring the country in a rock band, she thought law enforcement was at her door with bad news of a possible car accident involving a family member.

Instead, Hammers was served foreclosure papers by Texas-based Nationstar Mortgage and the Fort Lauderdale law firm of Marshall Watson on a Port St. Lucie home Hammers and her parents sold in 1994 — a property she hasn’t owned or seen in 15 years.

“He was ringing the door bell, banging real hard on the door … the dogs were going crazy,” Hammer said. “When I asked him who he was. He asked me if I was Cathy and told me I was being served foreclosure papers. He said he was a process server with ASAP Legal Services and then just took off.”

According to court documents filed in St. Lucie County, a quit claim deed and satisfaction of mortgage were filed by Hammers and her parents on the home at 2291 S.W. Susset Lane in 1994.

Treasure Coast legal experts say Hammers’ case could be one of the most unusual to occur within the 19th Judicial Circuit, which encompasses Martin, St. Lucie, Indian River and Okeechobee counties.

“When I talked to Marshall Watson, Sonya in their litigation department, and asked why I was being served foreclosure papers on a mortgage I did not sign, on a property I haven’t lived in for almost 20 years, she got snippety with me and asked if I had an attorney. Why would I need an attorney when they’ve made the mistake?” Hammers said.

Marshall Watson is one of four practices under investigation by the Florida attorney general for questionable foreclosure paperwork. Attorneys Ida Moghimi-Kian and Ingrid Fadil, who are listed on Marshall Watson’s foreclosure documents, did not return calls.

Scripps Treasure Coast Newspapers began its investigation and contacted the Florida Attorney General’s Office early Tuesday, but staff declined to comment on the state’s active investigation into Marshall Watson and Hammers’ specific situation.

“Our office is inquiring into the situation and will be contacting the company to discuss this issue directly,” said Sandi Copes, spokeswoman for the Florida Attorney General’s Office, late Tuesday afternoon.

By Thursday, Hammers said Marshall Watson had completely changed their tune.

“They apologized profusely and said they would prepare the documents for me to sign … and that they were going to file a motion with the courts to remove my name from the foreclosure completely,” an ecstatic Hammers said. “I don’t know who called who or what was said, but their treatment of this completely changed. I felt like I was being treated like scum before, like a nobody. No one wanted to listen to me at their office.”

Hammers said she still planned to file her complaint with Copes’ office to document Marshall Watson’s treatment of the situation.

Nationstar Mortgage’s attorney Matt Floyd said the problem stemmed from an error in the way the home’s quit claim deed was recorded in the ‘90s. He said Nationstar contracts with law firms, including Marshall Watson, to process and serve foreclosure notices.
Continue reading “Virginia resident gets foreclosure notice on Port St. Lucie home she sold in 1994”

BofA Mortgage Morass Deepens on Promissory Notes Issues

BofA Mortgage Morass Deepens on Promissory Notes Issues

By Prashant Gopal and Jody Shenn – Nov 30, 2010

Testimony by a Bank of America Corp. employee in a New Jersey personal bankruptcy case may give more ammunition to homeowners and investors in their legal battles over defaulted mortgages.

Linda DeMartini, a team leader in the company’s mortgage- litigation management division, said during a U.S. Bankruptcy Court hearing in Camden last year that it was routine for the lender to keep mortgage promissory notes even after loans were bundled by the thousands into bonds and sold to investors, according to a transcript. Contracts for such securitizations usually require the documents to be transferred to the trustee for mortgage bondholders.

In the case, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Judith H. Wizmur on Nov. 16 rejected a claim on the home of John T. Kemp, ruling his mortgage company, now owned by Bank of America, had failed to deliver the note to the trustee. That could leave the trustee with no standing to take the property, and raises the question of whether other foreclosures could similarly be blocked.

Following the decision, the bank disavowed the statements by DeMartini, whom it had flown in from California to testify. It was the policy of Countrywide Financial Corp., acquired by Bank of America in July 2008, to deliver notes as called for in its securitization contracts, according to Larry Platt, an attorney at K&L Gates LLP in Washington designated by the bank to answer questions about the case. Continue reading “BofA Mortgage Morass Deepens on Promissory Notes Issues”

Quantitative Easing Explained

What the Federal Reserve is up to, and how we got here.